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International Financial Contagion during the Subprime Credit Crisis 
Xuan Luo 
This study examines the financial contagion among G-7 countries during the 
subprime credit crisis from July 2007 through December 2008. Specifically, we 
investigate the excess comovements of stock indices of the banking sectors of G-7 
countries. We examine innovations - the component which cannot be explained by 
the fundamental factors - of the banking sector indices of G-7 countries. Innovations 
are defined as the residuals from the regression of banking sector indices on a set of 
explanatory variables using GARCH. We use eight macroeconomic variables and the 
return of a global stock index to capture the fundamental effects. We identify the 
excess comovement evidenced by the fact that the estimated innovation of one 
country significantly affects the stock indices of the other countries. However, we find 
no evidence that the explanatory power of estimated innovation increases during the 
subprime crisis, which suggests that the subprime crisis does not trigger excess 
comovement. Furthermore, we employ correlation coefficient tests. We estimate the 
innovation using VAR models, controlling for the aforementioned fundamental 
variables. We then examine the correlation coefficients of estimated innovations 
among G-7 countries. We do not find any evidence that the excess comovements 
significantly increase during the subprime crisis. Hence, our study does not support 
the notion that the subprime crisis triggered financial contagion in the banking sectors 
of G-7 countries. 
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International Financial Contagion during the Subprime Credit Crisis 
1 Introduction 
Starting in the summer of 2007, the subprime credit crisis, triggered by an 
unexpectedly large default rate of subprime mortgage loans in the U.S., caused a striking 
shrink in the capital of many banks and tightened credit around the world. A housing 
downturn turned into a crisis by an innovation called securitization. Financial firms 
bought up mortgages, bundled and securitized them into mortgage backed securities 
(MBS), which derive their value from mortgage payments and housing prices. This 
innovation, which enabled institutions and investors around the world to invest in the 
U.S. housing market, gave rise to housing and credit bubbles since it urged the mortgage 
industry to grant more loans to so-called subprime borrowers. In addition to mortgage 
and other asset-backed securities, financial firms created other derivatives, such as credit 
default swaps. This financial complexity made the entire system extremely fragile. As 
housing prices declined, the major global financial institutions that had borrowed and 
invested heavily in subprime MBS suffered significant losses. The heavy leverage of 
financial firms also played a critical role in making the housing downturn a crisis. The 
'asset velocity' allowed banks to reuse capital multiple times as assets were originated 
and speedily moved off balance-sheets through securitisation. In addition, the 
compensation system of financial firms was criticized because it motivated everyone 
from mortgage brokers to Wall Street risk managers to tolerate short-term risk-taking 
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behaviour, while ignoring long-term obligations. Consequently, the failure of risk 
management created the path to the crisis. 
When the crisis unfolded, it spilled out of the credit markets and influenced other 
sectors of the economy. As has been documented by Longstaff (2008), the effects of the 
subprime credit crisis transmitted from lower-rated asset-based securities indices (ABX) 
of subprime mortgage-related asset-backed collateralized debt obligation (CDOs) to 
higher-rated ABX indices, and in turn traversed the boundary of subprime markets and 
spread into the Treasury bond and stock markets. Did the effect of the crisis also spread 
over the boundaries of countries? As shown in Dungey et al. (2008), the shock of the 
subprime crisis spread into Argentina via a link between its stock market and that of the 
U.S. It also influenced Russia through the bond market link. The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), in its Global Financial Stability Report (2008), announces that 'the crisis is 
spreading beyond the U.S. subprime market'. It documents that the United States remains 
the center of the epidemic crisis and financial institutions in other countries are subject to 
the effects of the crisis. 
As destructive as the subprime credit crisis is, it provides, from a research 
perspective, an excellent opportunity to study financial contagion across countries in 
response to the crisis. To this end, we conduct this work to examine financial contagion 
among G-7 countries during the subprime credit crisis. Our objective is to identify 
whether the subprime crisis is associated with financial contagion and to test the changes 
in strength of the international comovements due to the subprime crisis. Our study, 
however, does not mean to address the channels through which the effects of the 
subprime crisis have spread. Different from the studies focusing on the major stock index 
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of each country, we concentrate on the comovements of stock indices of banking sectors 
among G-7 countries since the banking sector has suffered the most direct impact from 
the subprime mortgage crisis and credit contraction. In order to shed light on whether the 
crisis is associated with financial contagion, we collect data for both the pre-crisis and the 
crisis periods to compare the comovements of banking sector indices before and during 
the subprime crisis. The full sample period of our study is from January 2002 to January 
2009. 
Following previous literature (Pericoli and Sbracia 2003; Dungey and Tambakis 
2005), we define contagion as the excess cross-country comovements which cannot be 
explained by macroeconomic fundamental factors. Such a definition is, however, 
different from Forbes and Rigobon (2002), who define that contagion exists when the 
cross-market correlation increases significantly. We use a two-stage threshold AR(1)-
GARCH(1,1) -in-mean model ' to test the existence of contagion and examine the 
marginal contagion2 brought by the subprime crisis. We begin by using the threshold 
AR(1)-GARCH (1, l)-in-mean model to estimate the response of the banking sector's 
indices of G-7 countries to fundamental factors of their own country economies, and to 
the shock of the global economy. We use eight country-level macroeconomic variables: 
the rate of growth of real gross domestic production (GDP); capital price index (CPI); 
unemployment rate; inflation rate; short-term interest rate; depreciation rate; current 
account; and capital account to control for the macroeconomic fundamentals. We also 
adopt the Morgan Stanley Composite Index (MSCI) world index as a global factor to 
1
 The two-stage threshold AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) -in-mean model proposed by Hsin (2004) is operated in two 
steps with an asymmetric term (the threshold) in the volatility model to control for the asymmetric effect in 
response to the negative innovations; and with one lagged stock indices (AR(1) term) in the mean model. 
2
 The marginal contagion denotes the additional financial contagion specifically due to the subprime credit 
crisis, after differentiating the crisis contagion from the non-crisis contagion. 
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approximate the shock of global economic conditions. The estimated residuals from the 
first stage GARCH model represent innovations that cannot be explained by the 
fundamental factors. We then use the residual of each country as an explanatory variable 
in the GARCH model to examine whether the innovation of country X has explanatory 
power on the index of country Y. The second stage GARCH model reveals whether 
contagion occurs; in other words, whether the innovation of banking index in country X 
affects the banking index of country Y. We find mutual contagion between the U.S. and 
four other countries: Canada, France, Germany, and the U.K., while there is no excess 
comovement between the U.S. and either Italy or Japan. The mutual contagion is 
especially pronounced between Canada and the U.S., suggesting that the banking sectors 
of the U.S. and Canada are highly related. We also observe regional contagion in Europe. 
We do not find evidence that the volatility of the U.S. banking sector increases the 
volatility of the banking sectors of the other countries. Furthermore, we extend the 
second stage GARCH model by adding an interaction term of a crisis dummy and the 
aforementioned innovations in order to test whether the crisis is associated with 
contagion. We find no evidence that the subprime crisis is related with contagion from 
the U.S. to other countries. 
To further address the cross-country effects due to the macro-fundamental factors, 
we apply a vector autoregressive regression (VAR) model. We estimate the VAR model 
in which the explanatory variables are augmented with the cross-market macroeconomic 
variables. The estimated residuals from the VAR model are employed to study the 
financial contagion. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) document that the heteroscedasticity 
bias exists in the test of comovements and propose an adjusted correlation coefficient test. 
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We thus examine the comovements of the estimated residuals using both unadjusted and 
adjusted correlation coefficient tests. 
To identify if there is any significant increase in banking sector comovements in 
response to the subprime crisis, we further decompose the sample period into the pre-
crisis period, named the tranquil period, and the crisis period, named the turmoil period. 
We compare the correlation coefficients of the estimated residuals during both the 
tranquil period and the turmoil period to test whether the strength of the comovements 
increases significantly. 
Using the unadjusted correlation coefficient test, we find that the crisis is 
associated with increases in the correlations of residuals between the U.S. and the other 
three countries: Canada, France and the U.K. Canada experiences the highest increase in 
correlation coefficient among these three countries. However, once the correlation 
coefficients are adjusted for heteroscedasticity, we find no evidence that the crisis 
increases the correlation coefficients. This result is consistent with our findings from the 
GARCH model. Overall, we conclude that the cross-country excess comovements exist 
among the banking sectors of G-7 countries. However, the subprime crisis is not 
associated with the unexplained comovements. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the 
subprime crisis caused financial contagion among the banking sectors of G-7 countries. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the related literature 
reviews regarding the definition and possible causes of contagion. It also describes 
empirical methodologies to test the existence of contagion. Section 3 demonstrates the 
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research design. Section 4 describes the sample and the selected variables and Section 5 
provides the empirical results. Section 6 concludes the study. 
2 Related Literature 
2.1 Historical Definition of Financial Contagion 
There is no consensus on the definition of contagion. Previous literature (Calvo 
and Reinhart 1996; Dornbusch et al. 2000; Dungey and Tambakis 2005) generally 
classifies two types of contagions based on the causes of contagion. One is fundamental-
related contagion. This contagion occurs when the capital and/or trade markets across 
countries are highly integrated, and such -integration facilitates the transmission of 
disturbances. That is, the disturbance in one market is transmitted to the other markets 
through fundamental-related links, such as international trade, dynamics in exchange 
rates, international capital flow and financial links created by the banking system, 
common lenders, and international portfolio diversification management. Such 
fundamental-related contagion includes liquidity effects, as classified by Dungey and 
Tambakis (2005). This type of contagion has also been termed as 'spillovers' (Masson 
1998, 1999); 'fundamentals-based contagion' (Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000a); or 
'interdependence' (Forbes and Rigobon 2002) which is associated with the 
macroeconomic fundamentals among market economies. 
There are some excess comovements during an episode of crisis which cannot be 
explained by the correlation of economy fundamentals. These unexplained excess 
comovements occur even when the common shocks and all possible fundamental 
interconnections between countries are absent or controlled. Recent literature (Kaminsky 
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and Reinhart 2000a; Edwards 2000; Forbes and Rigobon 2002; Moser 2003) tends to 
regard this category of contagion as 'pure contagion', 'true contagion', or as contagion 
itself differentiated from interdependence. This restrictive definition specifies contagion 
as a situation under which the magnitude of the transmission of shocks goes beyond the 
ex-ante expectation based on the knowledge of fundamentals. Instead of the links of 
macroeconomic fundamental factors, these excess comovements may be more closely 
related to an investor's rational or irrational behaviour. The proposed reasons to cause 
this excess transmission include information asymmetry and heterogeneity, multiple 
equilibriums and momentum trading. Different from the classification of Dungey and 
Tambakis (2005), Dornbusch et al. (2000) regard the liquidity effect as a non-
fundamental-based cause of contagion. 
In the discussion below, we regard the first category of contagion, the 
fundamental-related contagion, as interdependence, and the second category of contagion, 
the investor's behavior-related contagion, as contagion. Throughout this paper, contagion 
is defined as excess comovements, which cannot be explained by fundamental factors. 
We follow the classification criteria of Dornbusch et al. (2000) and include liquidity 
effects as one of the investor's behavior-related causes of contagion. 
2.1.1 Interdependence 
2.1.1.1 Common Shocks and Competitive Devaluation 
A major economic shift, such as a change of commodity prices, a fluctuation of 
the exchange rate, or a change of the strength of the currency in one country, can lead to a 
global market adjustment which is represented by comovement in asset prices or capital 
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flows. Masson and Mussa (1996) term the phenomena of a major economic shift in 
industrial countries resulting in a crisis in emerging markets as 'monsoonal effects'. The 
vulnerability of those emerging markets is attributed to the exposure to foreign currency 
borrowing and government debt. Furthermore, 'the vulnerability is greater when there is a 
large (floating rate) debt, when reserves are low, and when the trade balance is in deficit' 
(Masson 1998). Eichengreen and Rose (1999) document that the instability in foreign 
exchange markets may result in a speculative attack which has negative impacts on the 
international competitiveness of the countries and their current accounts. For instance, the 
depreciation of the Pound sterling in September 1992 impaired the export 
competitiveness of the U.K. Similarly, Finland's devaluation had a negative impact on 
Sweden since both Finland and Sweden compete for exports in the common third markets. 
The sharp devaluation of the Japanese Yen in 1995 increased the competitiveness of 
Japan. However, the devaluation reduced simultaneously foreign direct investment (FDI) 
from Japan to other countries (Diwan and Hoekman 1999). Goldstein (1998) indicates 
that 'one country after another in a region undergoes a depreciation of its currency, the 
countries that have not devalued experience deterioration in competitiveness, which in 
turn makes their currencies more susceptible to speculative attacks'. The changes in 
interest rate in one country will also influence other countries through international 
capital flows. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) examine the linkage between the changes in the 
U.S. interest rates and the capital flows to Latin America. They find that 'international 
capital movements are all significantly affected by swings in interest rates in the U.S.'. 
2.1.1.2 Trade and Financial Links 
9 
Trade in goods and demands can give rise to a channel of international 
transmission of shocks via the terms of trade. Eichengreen et al. (1996) find that 'trade, 
rather than revisions of expectations based on macroeconomic factors, has been a 
dominant channel of transmission for contagious crises for the bulk of the sample period'. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000b) distinguish several propagation patterns of shocks. One 
of them is that the transmission from one periphery country to another periphery country 
occurs if there is a direct linkage of bilateral trade or finance between the two countries. 
Pavlova and Rigobon (2007) explore the demand shocks which produce cross-market 
spillovers, and the trade of goods from an international perspective. They overturn 
previous beliefs that the productivity shock is the only source of uncertainty by applying 
the terms of trade to determine the dynamics in both stock and bond markets. In this way, 
not only can they study the dramatic dynamics and spillovers from an international 
perspective, but they can also keep tractability. Their results reveal that the demand 
shocks are twice as important as supply shocks in describing the dynamics of asset prices 
and it is likely that demand shocks reflect consumer confidence and represent differences 
in opinion. The globalization of economics involves not only trade links but also financial 
connections. One of these financial links is FDI. A shock in one country will lead to a 
reduction in FDI outflows into other countries. A small country may be more attractive 





Liquidity concern can cause financial contagion because speculative investors 
may liquidate assets which are not directly affected by shocks. Kyle and Xiong (2001) 
develop a continuous-time framework to show that liquidity may cause financial 
contagion through a wealth effect. The changes of asset prices are determined 
endogenously as a function of endogenous wealth and exogenous noise. The phenomenon 
of contagion is explained with a theoretical model in which the level of risk aversion is 
subject to a wealth effect of a group of perfectly competitive convergence traders. When 
convergence traders encounter losses, the market liquidity decreases, while the price 
volatility and market correlation increase as the result of the reaction of convergence 
traders who liquidate positions in markets of risky assets. Kyle and Xiong (2001) 
contribute contagion to the liquidating effect of financial intermediaries on the markets. 
Their result confirms the finding of Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000b). Based on the 'event 
study' approach, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000b) analyze the Russian-LTCM crisis by 
observing the daily behaviour of financial indicators over thirty-five countries around the 
crisis period. They unveil that there were dramatic liquidating activities which resulted in 
the reduced liquidity of markets and increased price volatilities. 
International commercial banks are also subject to liquidity problems. One 
representative study in this field by Allen and Gale (2000) suggests that interregional 
claims of bank holding is one main channel of the international financial contagion when 
there is a small liquidity preference shock in one region. The interbank deposits are 
designed to deal with the regional liquidity demands. The region with liquidity surpluses 
can provide other regions with enough deposits so that when there is a liquidity shock in 
one region, it can be solved by exchanging deposits between banks. Such a mechanism, 
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however, fails to work if there is an excess demand for liquidity since the healthy regions 
would rather shut the door to avoid a drainage of liquidity caused by the troubled region. 
Allen and Gale (2000) suggest that if the interbank market is complete, if the banks in the 
troubled region have direct claims on banks in any other regions and if the regions are 
fully connected to one another, the effect of a financial crisis can be absorbed within the 
banking system without escalating to financial contagion. Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(2000a) also stress the role of liquidity play in the propagation. They point out that when 
the banks of one country in turmoil have extensive exposure to other countries, the 
common lenders, in particular, foreign commercial banks, can act to not only exacerbate 
the crisis by calling loans and drying up credit lines in the troubled country, but also 
transmit the shocks by calling loans from other countries. 
2.1.2.2 Information Asymmetries and Heterogeneity 
As one of the common suggested causes of contagion, information asymmetry 
frequently receives attention among scholars. In this category, people claim that 
contagion occurs regardless of the underlying structure of the economy, as a result of the 
failure to distinguish between idiosyncratic and systematic shocks to the fundamentals. 
King and Wadhwani (1990) argue that it is information asymmetry that leads uninformed 
traders to incorrectly update their beliefs of payoffs from assets and markets in response 
to an idiosyncratic shock. King and Wadhwani (1990) examine the changes in cross-
market correlations after a stock market crash with a framework in which the 
transmission of shocks occurs as a result of rational agents' attempts to infer information 
from price changes. Their model is based on the assumption that there are two types of 
information: idiosyncratic and systematic information. The former indicates that 
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information is of a specific country, while the latter casts influence on all markets. When 
the information structure is complex and the dimensions of the signal space surpass the 
dimensions of the price space, to infer information from the change of market prices may 
not be effective since the stock prices no longer fully reveal agents' private information. 
The non-fully-revealing equilibrium may imply the possibility of contagion effects. With 
high-frequency data, King and Wadhwani (1990) find evidence that there is a cross-
market transmission beyond the explanation of a fully-revealing fundamental model, 
which is in support of the observation of the contagion between the stock markets in New 
York, London and Tokyo in October 1987. Pasquariello (2007), in particular, sheds light 
on the new angle that the intensity of excess comovement may rise along with the 
increase of heterogeneity of investors' information endowments. He employs 
information heterogeneity, a more realistic view of a financial market, to explore the 
propagation of shocks across fundamentally unrelated assets. He defines information 
heterogeneity as significant and persistent differences in the endowment of private 
information among market participants. He claims that contagion may be an equilibrium 
outcome once the insiders obtain heterogeneous information and trade accordingly. In his 
framework, information asymmetry is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
occurrence of financial contagion across assets or markets. In addition, the strengthening 
of financial integration of the world equity market, as well as financial liberalization, 
have attracted more professional traders to participate in it, and hence the phenomenon of 
asymmetric sharing of information among insiders is likely to exist. On one hand, this 
trend may increase the rate of information sharing and, thus, reduce the strength of 
contagion resulting from information noise and uninformative trading shocks. On the 
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other hand, this trend may increase the possibility that the financial shocks will spread 
into unrelated fundamentals. Kallberg and Pasquariello (2008) adopt market return 
volatility over a certain interval as a proxy for the level of information asymmetry among 
markets. They also use the dispersion in analysts' earning forecasts (EPS) to determine 
information heterogeneity unrelated to risk. Their result provides evidence that 
information heterogeneity among traders is the most relevant source of excess 
comovements, which is consistent with the notion introduced by Pasquariello (2007). 
This suggests that portfolio rebalancing activities motivated by rational consideration, 
rather than by risk, may play an important role in explaining contagion. Furthermore, 
Yuan (2005) addresses crises and contagion within a rational expectations equilibrium 
framework, in which downward price movements have been endogenous ly induced by 
the interaction of information asymmetry and borrowing constraints. Such a constrained 
information asymmetry explains why small fundamental shocks and asymmetric price 
distributions may result in large price movements and the contagion-vulnerability of 
markets with independent and fewer risk factor sharing assets. 
2.1.2.3 Multiple Equilibria 
Contagion occurs when a shock in one country triggers a switch of equilibrium in 
other countries (Pericoli and Sbracia 2003). Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that there 
are two feasible equilibria in modeling bank runs. One equilibrium brings a good 
outcome as banks remain solvent to pay off high returns to all investors. The other 
equilibrium results in a panic where all participants withdraw funds from a bank since 
they believe that other participants' withdrawals are forcing the bank to cut high-profit 
investments. Upon the occurrence of an economic crisis, there will be a possible switch 
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from the 'good' equilibrium to the 'bad' equilibrium. Similar to a bank run, when a 
switch takes place, the other countries will withdraw their funds or FDI from the troubled 
country in a panic that they will not be able to claim the foreign exchange reserves if they 
act too late. Masson (1998) also suggests that 'contagion would occur when the home 
country jumps to a "bad" equilibrium when there is a crisis in another emerging country'. 
The logic is that the increase of interest rate will result in the rise of debt service costs, 
which in turn places pressure on the reserves and spurs devaluation. Masson claims that 
the size of the stock of external debt is an important determinant to the occurrence of 
multiple equilibria. His later work (1999) further documents that macroeconomic 
fundamentals alone hardly justify contagion in response to Mexico's Tequila crisis, 
which affected Latin America in 1994, or contagion from Thailand to the other East 
Asian countries in 1997. Trade and competitiveness linkages are not convincing in 
explaining the spread of contagion. Masson adds that 'multiple equilibria can occur only 
in certain ranges for macroeconomic fundamentals, implying, in particular, conditions on 
reserves and the level of external debt'. Within these ranges, 'jumps between multiple 
equilibria, and hence contagion triggered by a crisis elsewhere, is possible'. 
2.1.2.4 Momentum Trading 
Active trading is made upon the reception of others' trading behaviour. Rational 
herding theory indicates that market participants are inclined to follow the herd even 
though they have their own information. Momentum trading, which is argued to be 
triggered by herding tendency, imitation, etc., may be one source of contagion by linking 
the prices among fundamentally unrelated assets or markets. Calvo and Mendoza (2000) 
argue that contagion may occur as an outcome of herding by imitating arbitrary 
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international portfolios. When the marginal cost exceeds the marginal gain in gathering 
necessary decision-making information concerning market return, portfolio managers 
have an incentive to imitate arbitrary market portfolios. The range of optimal portfolios 
widens along with the growth of the market. The investors mimic one optimal portfolio 
according to market rumours. Hirshlerfer and Teoh (2008) examine theory and evidence 
about how the herding activities of individuals affect financial decisions and market 
prices. They point out that the financial decisions 'tend to converge quickly upon 
mistaken action choices'. In addition, they also take into consideration 'the readiness of 
investors to herd'. Although in perfect markets, investors tend to apply their own private 
information instead of imitating the others' investment behaviour, when uncertainty 
increases, investors may act opposite to the private information they have. 
An influential early attempt by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) uses the behavioural 
principle to predict a new market anomaly and provides empirical evidence to support the 
overreaction hypothesis that most traders tend to 'overreact' to unforeseeable shocks. By 
testing two main hypotheses, that the extreme movements in stock prices result in the 
subsequent price movements in the opposite direction and that the subsequent adjustment 
will act in accordance with the initial price movement, they reveal an implied violation in 
the market efficiency. Wermers (1999) conducts a comprehensive empirical test to 
determine the existence of herding tendency in the investors' trading behaviour and the 
impact of herding on the stock prices based on a data set of mutual funds over a 20-year 
period. He examines a set of stocks traded by a number of mutual funds. He classifies 
that herding behaviour is present on a stock if there are large imbalances between the 
number of buyers and sellers of the specific stock. When focusing on the subgroups of 
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stocks, he finds that there is a higher level of herding in small stocks and that such herds 
indicate the buy-side in the past winners and the sell-side in the past losers, implying that 
traders adopt 'rational' positive-feedback (momentum) trading strategies. Sias (2004) 
argues that an institutional investor either follows the past trading strategy of its peers 
(herding), or follows its own past trading strategy. The cross-sectional correlation 
between the trading over adjacent periods can be decomposed into two components: one 
part resulted from herding behaviour and the other part resulted from the tendency of 
following their own trading strategies. 
2.2 Empirical Studies of Financial Contagion 
2.2.1 Measures of Financial Contagion 
To facilitate the measure of financial contagion, many efforts have been made to 
define contagion and interdependence. Previous literature (Sutton 2000; Forbes and 
Rigobon 2002; Corsetti el al. 2005) distinguishes contagion from interdependence from 
different perspectives. 
Sutton (2000) studies the excess volatility and excess comovement of interest 
rates among five major bond markets: the U.S., Japan, Germany, the U.K. and Canada. 
By studying the behaviour of long-term interest rates, they explore the joint behaviour of 
bond yields between countries. In his paper, excess comovement exists when two 
conditions coincide. One is that two asset prices display excess volatility. The other is 
that the deviation of prices from predicted ones are positively correlated across assets. 
17 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) identify contagion in a rather narrow and restricted 
spectrum as a significant increase in market-wide linkages after a shock to one country or 
a group of countries. Contagion occurs only when the comovement increases 
significantly after a shock. Otherwise, the pairwise linkage among countries, even strong, 
can be classified as interdependence only. Defining contagion in this way provides two 
important advantages. The first one is that it makes the method of testing whether 
contagion occurs straightforward. The second one is that it allows distinguishing possible 
explanations on how the shocks are spread across borders. This definition is also 
consistent with an earlier popular explanation made by King and Wadhwani (1990). They 
investigate the reason why almost all stock markets fell in October 1987 following the 
Wall Street crash, despite the widely different economic circumstances of each market. 
For the convenience of their test, they define contagion as a significant change in the 
correlation coefficient. Also, Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) discuss cross-country 
comovements from the aspect of both price and quantitative dimensions. Only a 
significant increase in comovements, 'excessive comovements', can account for 
contagion when a crisis occurs in one market or a group of markets. Such a definition 
stresses the difference between the interdependence-related normal comovements and the 
excessive comovements. Kallberg and Pasquariello (2008) define contagion as the 
covariation above the level resulting from 'common factors'. They determine the excess 
covariation as the correlation between two assets which cannot be explained by the 
fundamental factors. 
Recent works by Corsetti el al. (2005) and Jokipii and Lucey (2007) define 
contagion as a structural break in the linear transmission mechanism of financial shocks, 
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which mainly results in an intensification of relationships between different countries 
over the period of market turmoil. They also regard interdependence as a "divergent 
phenomenon" because it causes no change in the aforementioned relationships. Corsetti 
et al. (2005), furthermore, notice two important features based on their testing 
framework. One is that the shock of a common factor tends to trigger large comovements 
in prices during the turmoil episode. The other is that the test is symmetrical because it 
can be applied to structural breaks and contagion consisting of looser interdependence 
(neglected fundamental factor loading). They challenge the previous literature by Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002) by claiming that it is not reasonable to define contagion as a 
significant increase in correlations and that the tests of contagion based on this definition 
may be biased in favour of the null interdependence. 
2.2.2 Methodologies and Evidence 
2.2.2.1 Pro bit and Logit Models and Leading Indicators 
To test whether a systematic effect on the probability of a speculative attack on 
one market is conditional on the occurrence of a crisis in other markets, Eichengreen et al. 
(1996) adopt an ad hoc exchange market pressure approach by constructing a weighted 
average index of exchange rate changes, reserve changes, and interest rate changes. In 
their framework, crisis, as a dependent dummy variable, is determined as a unit value 
when the extreme values are present in the index and as zero otherwise. Independent 
variables consist of a set of macroeconomic and political fundamental factors. Their 
Probit results indicate that a speculative attack on the foreign currencies increases the 
odds of an attack on the domestic currency by 8% without being conditional on the size 
19 
or on any other relevant attacks. They also use this framework to determine the 
importance of transmission channels of trade and macroeconomic similarities. They find 
that the effect of contagion is much stronger through trades than through similarity of 
macroeconomic conditions. Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) develop some leading 
indicators of competition for bank funds to explain the pattern of international bank 
lending during three crises in Mexico, Asia, and Russia. Specifically, they examine 
disaggregated flows to test the hypothesis that the spread of a currency crisis is triggered 
by the banks' behaviour in response to losses in the troubled country. They study the link 
between a bank's capital flows and exposure to the crisis-originating country, after 
controlling for the other determinants of bank flows. Using multivariate OLS, they find 
that it is the common lender channel through which the shocks have been propagated. 
Forbes (2000) applies the event-study method to examine how the crises of the Asian Flu 
and Russian Virus had impacts on world-wide firms by calculating the abnormal returns 
of stocks in her sample. By constructing a unique data set of 10,000 companies from 45 
countries, she finds that sales exposure to the countries in crisis plays a crucial role in 
influencing the returns of firms, while the higher debt ratios may shelter firms from 
suffering. Her findings confirm the idea that shocks are transmitted through trade 
channels. Gropp et al. (2006) apply a multinomial logit model to analyze contagion in a 
sample of European banks over the period of 1994 to 2003. They also adopt the distance 
to default, an indicator of bank soundness, to identify whether a bank suffers from a 
shock. They find strong evidence that the cross border contagion may be increased after 
the introduction of the Euro. Since their test is based on a non-crisis period, they 
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conclude that the contagion identified should be regarded as a lower bound to the true 
existing contagion. 
2.2.2.2 Correlation Coefficients Test 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) point out that the correlation coefficients are 
conditional on market volatility, which means that the traditional contagion tests based on 
the cross-market correlation coefficients may be subject to the heteroscedasticity bias. 
With proper adjustment, the comovement may highly depend on the fundamental factors 
instead of being classified as contagion. In their work, they apply a VAR framework in 
order to adjust the difference between stock market opening hours to control for serial 
correlation in stock returns and the exogenous global shocks. Specifically, they use five 
lags in the VAR model to deal with serial correlation and within-week variation in the 
trading patterns. Surprisingly, after applying cross-market correlation coefficient tests on 
the stock returns during the periods of the 1997 East Asian crisis, the 1994 Mexican peso 
devaluation, and the 1987 U.S. stock market crash,, their results show no evidence of 
contagion during three crises after correcting for the heteroscedasticity bias. 
To deal with the biases of simultaneous equations, omitted variables and 
heteroscedasticity simultaneously, Rigobon (2003) applies a new approach, Determinant 
of the Change in the Covariance matrix test (DCC), based on the assumption that if the 
heteroscedasticity in a sub-sample can be captured by a shift in the variance of a sub-set 
of shocks, then a test of the stability of the coefficients will become possible. One 
advantage that makes the DCC approach stand out is that the null hypothesis of no 
contagion will be rejected when the assumption mentioned above is violated. The model 
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is extended to account for trends, lags, and other additional controls. There is a trade-off 
when applying one control variable, interest rates, as a proxy for some of the omitted 
variables. This control variable captures common shocks such as monetary policy 
coordination across countries and changes in risk preferences which cannot be observed. 
However, the shortcoming is that the inclusion of interest rate may underestimate the 
transmission of shocks. Therefore, they conduct tests both with and without interest rate. 
Using the data of 36 daily stock market returns during 3 major international financial 
crises, Mexico 1994, Asia 1997 and Russia 1998, their test reveals that, except the 
Mexican crisis during which the transmission mechanism was relatively stable, during the 
periods of both the Russian and Asian crises, the contagion effects have been identified, 
and they are even pronounced in the case of the Asian crisis. 
Specifically, Jokipii and Lucey (2007) research banking sectors of three main 
Central and Eastern European Countries, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, in order 
to find out whether there are comovements between these three countries over the period 
from July 1994 to December 2004 and whether the comovements, if any, are driven by 
contagion or interdependence. They first estimate the unadjusted correlation coefficients 
of the daily changes in the banking sector indices during the whole sample period and 
two sub-samples as turbulent and tranquil periods with the variance covariance generated 
by VAR They then control the effects from the country's own fundamental factors by 
introducing a series of dummy variables of macroeconomic news such as unemployment, 
short term interest rates, consumer price index, terms of trade, real GDP, current account 
deficit. It shows that the lagged bank indices respond sensitively to the release of both 
positive and negative macroeconomic news by reflecting statistically significant rises and 
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falls. They find that with the adjusted correlation coefficient test, the pair-wise 
comovement among countries can be driven by interdependence, except for the case 
between the Czech Republic and Hungary. After introducing the country's own 
macroeconomic factors, although the correlations between markets are high, the 
comovements are largely subject to the country's fundamental economic factors, except 
in the strong case of contagion from the Czech Republic to Hungary. The DCC test 
confirms the robustness of the previous outcome and the result of the granger-causality 
test shows that the causality runs from the Czech Republic to Hungary. 
Since the prices of stock indices may not fully convey information to capture the 
phenomenon of contagion, Royen (2002) proposes to use quantities, investment flows, to 
replace prices since quantities will surely exhibit a pattern which distinguishes between 
tranquil times and contagious episodes. Royen (2002) tests the model using a unique 
database of cross-border equity flows. She constructs a daily index to measure the 
average likelihood of contagion between August 1996 and September 2000. Instead of 
testing for contagion at specific points of time before the occurrence of the crises, she 
determines the relevant periods endogenously. In addition, she introduces two extra 
aggregate indices in an attempt to measure the pervasiveness of excessive transmission. 
The uniqueness of these indices is that they can be decomposed according to the regions 
and groups and they take into account the likelihood of contagion and the magnitude and 
directions of net equity flows so that they can be used to distinguish positive from 
negative contagion. The results show that contagion appears to be regional and it seems 
that developed countries are sheltered from the influence of contagion. 
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2.2.2.3 ARCH and GARCH Models 
A higher volatility of stock prices during a turmoil period may not necessarily be 
the result of some worldwide common factors. The importance of identifying the 
fundamental factors within a nation is key to exclude country-specific noise in testing for 
the contagion. In light of this consideration, Chiang et al. (2007) introduce a measure of 
interdependence from a standard factor model which needs no restriction on the variance 
of common factors. As has been proved by Chiang et al. (2007), the restrictions on 
country-specific noise can be the source of bias towards the acceptance of the null 
hypothesis of 'no contagion'. Although the simple-correlation analysis with a correction 
for heteroscedasticity proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) has been widely used in 
the literature, this method fails to capture the time-varying characteristics of the market 
behaviour in response to the shocks on an ongoing basis. A cross-country, multivariate 
dynamic conditional correlation GARCH model first introduced by Engle (2002) is, thus, 
employed in the study of Chiang et al. (2007) to measure the time-varying conditional 
correlations after weighting the limitations of the methods from previous literature. The 
benefit of applying this model is that it will solve the heteroscedasticity problem 
addressed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) without dividing the sample. It also helps deal 
with the omitted variable problem and to capture the global common factor, thus avoiding 
a simultaneous equation bias. Above all, it provides a sound mechanism to test time-
varying correlation coefficients, which makes it possible to identify the dynamic investor 
behaviour when there is news or innovations. Chiang et al. (2007) apply the model on 
nine Asian daily stock-return data series from 1990 to 2003. In comparison with the 
effectiveness of the method used by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), this model appears to be 
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more efficient in seperating the contagion from interdependence. In addition, by 
analyzing the correlation-coefficient series, they also identify two phases of the Asian 
crisis. One shows an increase in correlation and the other shows a continued high 
correlation that may be caused by herding. 
Hsin (2004) focuses on the international comovement among 10 major developed 
countries, which includes G-7 countries and three major Asia-Pacific countries: Australia, 
Hong Kong and Singapore. Different from Chiang et al. (2007), in his research, Hsin 
extends the method of the two-stage GARCH framework proposed by Lin et al. (1994) to 
account for the international transmission in terms of conditional volatility, the possible 
asymmetry in volatility, and the prevailing risk-return relationships. The high-frequency 
data, daily price Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) indices denominating in 
U.S. dollars are used in his study to keep track of the dynamics of international 
transmission. The advantages of using a threshold AR(l)-GARCH(l,l)-in-mean model is 
that it takes the dynamics in the stock returns into account and incorporates the 
mechanism of volatility transmissions simultaneously. Moreover, the multilateral impacts 
of different countries have been fully captured in the model, which helps avoid the 
problem of spurious observations of transmission effects as can be detected under the 
correlation tests and make the direct comparison about the impact strength possible. The 
results show the existence of significant international transmission effects in returns and 
volatility among ten major countries, and the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. are the three 
markets that still demonstrate contagion influence over countries outside their own 
region. The evidence also suggests that strong regional transmission effects exist. A 
further investigation using the extended model reveals that the linkages between the U.S. 
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and European markets are driven by positive global common forces and by negative 
international competitive effects. On the other hand, the U.S. and Asian markets are 
linked through positive global common forces and positive international contagion 
effects. The Asia-Pacific markets are more susceptible to contagion effects. Finally, they 
find that the performance of the Japanese market becomes more contagious toward other 
markets during the Asian financial crisis period. 
2.2.2.4 Markov Switching Models 
Jeanne and Masson (2000) propose to use a Markov-switching regimes approach 
in an empirical study on currency crises in line with the method suggested by Jeanne 
(1997). They illustrate the applicability of this model by studying the the French franc 
over the period of 1987 to 1993. They find that the model allowing for sunspot, an 
'extrinsic' random variable, is superior in explaining the experience of the French frank 
and tracking the episodes of speculation. It improves the relationship between the 
economic fundamentals and the devaluation expectations compared to an ordinary 
fundamental based model. 
To examine the nature of the currency crisis over the Mexican crisis episode in 
1994, Mouratidis (2008) extends the empirical framework proposed by Jeanne and 
Masson (2000) by allowing transition probabilities to be time-varying. Uniquely, he 
makes comparisons among three models: a Markov regime switching model (MRS) with 
time-varying transition probabilities; a linear benchmark model; and an MRS model with 
constant transition probabilities based on an out-of sample forecasting exercise. In line 
with Jeanne and Masson (2000), he also attempts to explain the procedure by which 
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currency crisis models with multiple equilibria can be estimated when employing the 
MRS model. Mouratidis's result implies that the explanation of the nature of a currency 
crisis is highly sensitive to the choice of proxy for the probability of devaluation. 
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3 Research design 
3.1 Definition of Financial Contagion 
In order to study the contagion effect that arises due to the subprime credit crisis, 
we define financial contagion as the cross-country excess comovements, i.e. the 
comovements of asset prices that exceed what can be explained by macroeconomic 
fundamental factors (see, e.g. Pericoli and Sbracia 2003; Dungey and Tambakis 2005). 
Accordingly, we use the GARCH and VAR model to filter the comovement effects due 
to fundamental factors, and then employ the estimated residuals from the first stage 
GARCH or VAR models to test the existence of excess comovements. Different from the 
studies focusing on the major stock index of each country, we concentrate on the 
comovements of stock indices of the banking sectors among G-7 countries, since the 
banking sector has suffered the most direct impact from the subprime mortgage crisis and 
credit contraction. In order to shed light on whether the crisis contributes to financial 
contagion, we collect data for both the pre-crisis period and the crisis period to compare 
the comovements of banking sector indices before and after the subprime crisis. The full 
sample period of our study is from January 2002 to January 2009. 
3.2 Methodology 
The empirical analysis in this paper focuses on assessing the comovements of the 
banking sector among G-7 countries during the subprime credit crisis. We employ two 
approaches to examine the question. 
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3.2.1 Two-stage Threshold AR(l)-GARCH(l,l)-in-Mean Framework 
Following the method proposed by Lin et al. (1994) and extended by Hsin (2004), 
we adopt the two-stage threshold AR(l)-GARCH(l,l)-in-mean model. In the first stage, 
stock indices of each country are regressed on one-lagged stock indices, a set of selected 
macroeconomic variables, and estimated conditional variance estimated using the 
GARCH (l,l)-in-mean model. The estimated residuals from the first stage model 
approximate the innovations of the corresponding markets. In the second stage, the 
estimated residuals of innovative countries are added into the regression in order to test 
whether a transmission of innovations exists across markets. Meanwhile, the volatility of 
the estimated residuals is added into the GARCH model to test the potential volatility 
spillover, i.e. the transmission of volatility across markets. The specification of the 
framework is as below. 
Stage 1: 
n,t =oct+ Pint-i + Yiht + ££ = 1 K^It^t + eix (1) 
Kt = *>/ + aiett-i + Mi , t - i + ftTiett-\ 
where eit\nt_1~N(0,hit), i^j. ritis the log-transformed banking sector index of 
market / at time t. hit is the conditional variance of residuals estimated using the 
GARCH (1,1) model. Iint denotes macro-fundamental variables for market /' at time t. 
n denotes the number of fundamental factors. We adopt eight country macroeconomic 
variables to capture the impact of fundamental factors. These variables are the growth 
rate of real GDP, growth rate of CPI, unemployment rate, inflation rate, short-term 
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interest rate, depreciation rate of currency, growth rate of trading value in current account 
and growth rate of capital flows in capital accounts. In addition, we use the MSCI world 
index as a global factor to approximate the shock of global economic conditions. el>t is 
the innovation, which is assumed to be serially uncorrected, mutually independent and 
following the GARCH process. The distribution of ett conditional upon the historical 
information matrix ilt-i is normal with mean 0 and variance hit. Zakoian (1994) points 
out that that positive and negative shock will influence the volatility asymmetrically. 
Therefore, in the GARCH model, we add one threshold dummy variable Tt. It is applied 
to measure the asymmetric effect of volatility. Tt = 1 when the innovation at time t-\ is 
negative and 0 otherwise. The asymmetric effect is reflected through/j. If/* is positive 
and significant, it indicates that the market reacts to bad news more strongly than to good 
news. 
In the second stage, the index of market j is allowed to respond to the innovations 
from other markets simultaneously. 
Stage 2 
f).t = ^ + Pjr]x_x + Yj V + S"=i * j , * W + E[=i &ij &i.t + vj,t (2) 
hjt = (Oj + a.jvfx_1 + bjhjf^ + 2{=1 Auelt + ftT}vfit^ 
where Vy)t|/2t_1~iV(0,/j7-ft.), i^j. rj,t is the log-transformed banking sector index of 
market j at time t. hj
 t is the conditional variance of residuals which are estimated using 
GARCH (1, 1) model. /;-jltjt denotes macro-fundamental variables for market j at time t. 
n denotes the number of fundamental factors. We adopt eight country macroeconomic 
30 
variables to capture the impact of the fundamental factors. These variables are the growth 
rate of real GDP, the growth rate of CPI, unemployment rate, inflation rate, short-term 
interest rate, depreciation rate of currency, growth rate of trading value in current account 
and growth rate of capital flows in capital accounts. In addition, we use the MSCI world 
index as a global factor to approximate the shock of global economic conditions. Vjt is 
the innovation, normal with mean 0 and variance hjt conditional upon Q^-^, the 
information matrix at time t-\. Tj denotes the threshold dummy variable. 7} = 1 when 
the innovation at time t-\ is negative and 0 otherwise. The asymmetric effect is reflected 
through/J. If fj is positive and significant, it indicates that the market reacts to bad news 
more strongly than to good news. 
eit is the estimated residual of innovative country / in the first stage model. St;- is 
the transmission coefficient of index j in response to the unexpected innovation from 
market /'. It acts as an indicator of the presence of a contagion effect in the model. If Stj 
is positive and significant, it shows that a contagion effect exists; if Stj is negative and 
significant, it indicates a reduction in transmission effects. XQ is the volatility 
transmission coefficient, which captures the dynamics of the volatility of market j in 
response to the unexpected innovations from market i. 
Our first null hypothesis is that there is no contagion effect, only interdependence, 
during our full sample period, which means the comovements among G-7 countries are 
triggered by the fundamental factors alone. 
Ho:Su<0 (3) 
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Hi: Su > 0 
A rejection of the null hypothesis, 8tj < 0, suggests that excess comovement 
between market / andj exists. 
To further identify the marginal transmission effect caused by the subprime credit 
crisis, we add one dummy variable 'D t ' into the model (2). The extended model in Stage 
2 is shown below. 
Stage 2a 
rJlt = ocj + Pfrht-i + Yjhjit + £"=i Kj>nIjiUit + E{= 1(5y + dSijDt)eiit + vjit (4) 
hi,t = "j + Ojvf,t-\ + bj '•j.t-i + E!=i Ki elt + ft Tjvf,t-\ 
where T^-it|/3t_1~iV(0,/ij>t), i & j . dSi}rdenotes the additional contagion effect from the 
subprime credit crisis. If dSitj is positive and significant, the additional contagion effect 
brought on by the subprime credit crisis is present. Dt = 1 if the date is from July 27, 
2007 to January 5, 2009; otherwise, Dt = 0. The other coefficients are identical to the 
coefficients in model (2). Our second null hypothesis is that there is no marginal 
contagion effect during the crisis. 
Ho-.dSijKO (5) 
Hx: dStJ > 0 
A rejection of the null hypothesis, d5ii; < 0, indicates that the subprime crisis 
increases the contagion effects between markets i and j . 
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3.2.2 Correlation Coefficient Test 
Although the two-stage threshold AR(1)-GARCH( 1,1)-in-mean model is capable 
of addressing heteroscedasticity and of capturing the dynamics of the comovements of 
stock indices, it fails to consider the cross-market macro-fundamental effects. This means 
that the change of economic conditions in country i may affect the stock price of country 
j through fundamental factors such as international trade and capital flows. Therefore, we 
apply vector autoregressive regression (VAR), followed by the correlation coefficient 
tests. 
3.2.2.1 Vector autoregressive regression 
The correlation coefficient test usually works on the residuals of the VAR test. 
The advantage is that it can provide better control over the cross-market macro-
fundamental effects, as well as serial correlation in indices. We treat the macro-
fundamental factors as exogenous variables in the VAR framework so that we can 
generate fundamental-effect-free vectors of disturbances. 
The general specification of the VAR framework takes the following form. 
Rt = c + Er=i Wit + E U <t>ni«* + vt (6) 
n _ (rCN rFR rGE rIT JP rUK rUS\i 
n — f„CW
 rFR rGE rIT JP rUK rUSV KL,t = i'L.t > rL,t ' ~L,t > rL,f 'L.t ' rlX • rl.t J 
I = fjCN :FR ;GE ;IT ,JP :UK :US\> l
n,t — \Ln,t> ln,t> Ln,t> lji,t> ln,t' n,t > lrt,tt 
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with E(r]t) = 0, E(r)t,ri't) = £ , E(r)t,r}'s) = 0 if t ^ s. rt is a vector of DataStream 
banking sector log index. Rt is a transposed vector of stock indices of G-7 countries. 
RLt is a transposed vector of lagged stock indices. <pL is the coefficient of lagged RLt . m 
denotes the autoregressive order. Int is a vector of exogenous macro-fundamental 
variables for G-7 countries. <Pn is a vector of the coefficients of macro variables In>t. n 
denotes the number of macro-fundamental factors. i]t is a vector of error terms. We 
select m with the autoregressive order of two according to the Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion. We first apply the VAR model (6) to obtain the vectors of residuals. 
The variance-covariance matrices are then estimated for the full sample and two sub-
samples based on VAR residuals. Subsequently, we use the estimated variance-
covariance matrices to calculate the cross-market correlation coefficients for each pair of 
countries. 
3.2.2.2 Unadjusted correlation coefficient test 
We classify the full sample period into the tranquil period from January 7, 2002 to 
July 26, 2007 and the turmoil period from July 27, 2007 to January 5, 2009. We estimate 
the correlation coefficient for the two sub-periods separately. Following the standard test 
method of Forbes and Rigobon (2002), we apply a two-sample t-test to examine whether 
these correlation coefficients significantly increase in the turmoil period compared to the 
tranquil period. The third hypothesis we consider here is 
Ho-plj>P?j (7) 
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where p\j and p£; are the correlation of VAR residuals between markets / and j during 
the tranquil and turmoil periods, respectively. A rejection of the null hypothesis suggests 
that correlation increases during the crisis. This indicates that the crisis increases excess 
comovements. 
3.2.2.3 Adjusted correlation coefficient test 
Previous studies (Loretan and English 2000; Forbes and Rigobon 2002) point out 
that the potential heteroscedasticity in the stock indices may severely bias the correlation 
coefficient tests. Without any adjustment, the tests for a significant increase can be 
inaccurate since there is a possibility that the increases in correlations result from an 
increase in market volatility. Actually, the heteroscedasticity correction they 
recommended is specifically needed when one estimates the residuals of VAR based on 
the data set of both crisis and non-crisis periods because the volatility of the crisis period 
is much larger than that of the non-crisis period (Dungey and Zhumabekova 2001).3 
Therefore, we apply a correction adjustment on the correlation coefficients following the 
method proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002). The adjustment takes the following 
form. 
3
 Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001) suggest that an alternative method to control for the heteroscedasticity 
is to estimate the VAR model for crisis and non-crisis periods separately. Given the limited number of 
observation during the subprime crisis period, and the large loss of degrees of freedom in a VAR model, a 
separate estimation is not feasible. We therefore adopt the adjusted correlation coefficient method. 
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where pfj denotes the correlation between the VAR residuals of country / and country j 
during the turmoil period. o%x and axx are the variances of the crisis country x , which 
is either country /' orj during the turmoil and tranquil periods, respectively. Similar to the 
third hypothesis, the fourth hypothesis is 
H0:plj>P?j (9) 
H1:plJ<p%, 
where p^J are the correlations after adjustment during the turmoil period. A rejection of 
the null hypotheis in the t-test indicates the significant increase in comovements due to 
the subprime credit crisis. 
In both the adjusted and unadjusted correlation coefficient t-tests, we employ a 
Fisher transformation. The Fisher transformation on the correlation coefficients is 




where t denotes h (7T) or I indicating the turmoil or tranquil period, pfj denotes the 
correlation between country /" and country j during the turmoil or tranquil period. nt 
indicates the observations during the turmoil or tranquil period. The two-sample t-
statistics are calculated with 
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One-sided t-tests are used to examine whether the cross-market correlation 
coefficients during the turmoil period are higher than those during the tranquil period. 
The critical value for the t-test at a 5% significance level is 1.65. If the t-statistic is equal 
or greater than 1.65, we identify that there is a significant increase due to the subprime 
crisis; otherwise, there is no increase. 
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4 Data 
We define the subprime crisis from July 27th, 2007 to January 5th, 20094. In order 
to analyze the difference between the comovements during both the subprime crisis and 
non-crisis periods, we study the comovements during the tranquil period starting from 
January 7th, 2002 to July 26th, 2006. We use DataStream banking sector indices of G-7 
countries following Jokipii and Lucey (2007). These indices are value-weighted indices, 
appropriate in that they can provide an accurate reflection of the major listed banks in 
each country. These indices are extracted based on local currency. We apply a 
logarithmic transformation on the banking sector indices. 
In order to control for the influence of the fundamental factors, we use the 
following macroeconomic fundamentals variables: the growth rate of real GDP, growth 
rate of CPI, unemployment rate, inflation rate, short-term interest rate, depreciation rate 
of currency, growth rate of trading value in current account and growth rate of capital 
flows in capital accounts. The short-term interest rate, which is approximated with three-
month Treasury bill rates, is adopted to control for the possible adverse effect from the 
rise of the short-term interest rate since the high interest rate will worsen bank balance 
sheets if banks' lending rates cannot be raised quickly enough. As has been shown in 
Galbis(1993), there is a direct connection between financial liberalization and the interest 
rate. The inclusion of short-term interest rates may also control the impact due to 
4
 The starting date of the subprime credit crisis is determined according to Dungey et al. (2008) and the 
official website of the National Bureau of Economic Research. The subprime credit crisis is, at the time of 
this study, an on-going crisis. Therefore, the ending date of the subprime credit crisis in this study is the last 
date on which the data are available. 
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financial liberalization. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) suggest that financial 
liberalization has some predictive power on the occurrence of banking crises. Financial 
liberalization may increase the vulnerability of the banking sector to a crisis since it 
increases the opportunities for excessive risk taking and fraudulence. Following 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), the depreciation rate, which is calculated as the 
rate of change of the exchange rate, is applied to control for the effect that the crisis may 
be triggered by an excessive exchange risk exposure in the banking sector or among bank 
borrowers. Both the trade values of national current capital accounts are adopted to 
reflect changes in the strength of the trade and financial links among countries. Foreign 
direct investment (FDI) is one major component of the capital account as both public and 
private international investments flowing in and out will be recorded by the capital 
account. A global factor controlling for the impact of global shocks is approximated with 
the MSCI world index, which is a value-weighted index that monitors the performance of 
stocks from around the world. 
We obtain the data of banking sector indices, GDP, CPI, unemployment rate, 
inflation rate, and depreciation rate from DataStream. The short-term interest rate, current 
account, capital account, and MSCI world index, we collect from Bloomberg and the 
websites of the centre banks of G-7 countries. Although daily data are recommended by a 
recent study (Hsin 2004), we apply weekly data of stock indices in our tests because most 
of the macroeconomic fundamental variables just have quarterly or monthly data. 
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5 Empirical results 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of log-transformed banking sector indices 
of G-7 countries. Panel A reports the full sample period. It shows that Japan is the most 
volatile country with an estimated standard deviation of 0.0513, while Canada is the least 
volatile market with a standard deviation of 0.0301. The kurtosis statistics for all G-7 
countries appear to be excessively high. Averaged indices are negative, except in Canada. 
Jarque-Bera statistics indicate that the distributions of log indices depart from normal for 
all seven countries. Panel B reports the summary statistics during the pre-crisis period. 
We find that the means of log indices are all positive. Furthermore, these series appear to 
be less volatile by comparing the standard deviation of the full period with that of the 
non-crisis period. As has been further confirmed by panel C, all means of log indices are 
negative and the standard deviations reflect that the series are highly volatile during the 
subprime credit crisis. 
Table 2 presents the correlations of G-7 countries. Panels A, B and C report the 
correlations of the full sample, pre-crisis and crisis periods, respectively. They show that 
stock indices of banking sectors are highly correlated among G-7 countries. However, 
we do not observe that the correlations increase for all pairs of countries during the 
turmoil period. Table 3 reports the Dickey Fuller test. Tests reject the null hypothesis of 
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non-stationary and the presence of a unit root at 1% level. Both GARCH tests and 
correlation coefficients tests, therefore, proceed. 
5.2 Two-stage Threshold AR(l)-GARCH(l,l)-in-mean Test Results 
The results of the first stage GARCH model are shown in Table 4. The 
asymmetric effects in volatility have been identified for Canada, the U.K., and the U.S. 
The estimated coefficients of ft (asymmetry) of the three countries are 0.0230, 0.2201, 
and 0.2482, respectively. This result suggests that the banking sectors of these countries 
are responding more strongly toward bad news than good news. However, the 
asymmetric coefficient for Italy is negatively significant (-0.2228). This may suggest that 
the market reacts more in favour of good news. The coefficients of lagged log indices are 
negative and significant for countries other than Japan. We observe that the depreciation 
rate and global factor are the most influential fundamental factors. The coefficient of the 
global factor for Germany is as high as 1.0676. Except for Canada, the coefficients of 
deprecation rates of the other countries in response to the U.S. dollar are significant. 
There is no significant response for the factors CPI, current account and capital account 
with the first stage GARCH tests. The log index of France shows a significantly negative 
reaction to GDP. Furthermore, only the log index of France reacts to the inflation rate and 
unemployment rate at a 1% significance level. As for the short-term interest rates, both 
Italy and Japan have significant negative responses. 
Table 5 provides the test results of contagion using the second stage GARCH 
model. The contagion effects we identified in the second stage are conditional on the 
fundamental factors we controlled in the model. We observe some contagion effects, as 
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shown in Panel A of Table 5. As shown in this panel, there are significant mutual 
contagion effects between the U.S. and the other four countries: Canada, France, 
Germany and the U.K. In terms of economic significance, Canada has the most important 
impact on the U.S. market, and Canada is also the one most affected by the U.S. We 
observe that the impact of Canada on the U.S. is larger than the impact of the U.S. on 
Canada. This may be due to the fact that the banking system of Canada is healthier than 
the banking system of the U.S. during this sample period. Specifically, Canada responds 
to the U.S. with coefficient 67jl (US)=0.3648, while the U.S. reacts to Canada with 
coefficient 817(CN)=0.4152. As for the U.K. and the U.S., however, it is the opposite. 
The U.S. casts more impact on the U.K. 
Furthermore, Panel A shows that the contagion effects tend to be regional. For 
instance, there are significant regional contagion effects among European countries, but 
relatively weak effects between European countries and countries such as Canada or 
Japan. For instance, the excess comovement between Germany and France, S32(GE), is 
0.3412, while the excess comovement between Germany and Japan, 835(GE), is only -
0.0407. Similarly, there is a mutual contagion effect between North American countries: 
Canada and the U.S. 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the transmission of volatility. Our results reflect 
relatively mild volatility transmission effects. This may be because both ARCH and 
GARCH effects in the model partially capture the variance spillovers and the first-
moment transmission effects have also been controlled in the mean equation. Canada and 
the U.K. appear to be the influential ones among G-7 countries with respect to volatility 
transmissions. For instance, Canada affects Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. with estimated 
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coefficients 0.2906, 0.0556, and 0.1518, respectively. We also observe positive and 
significant volatility transmissions from Japan to Germany and the U.S. Compared with 
the results in Panel A, we find that for some pairs of countries, there is evidence of 
volatility spillovers even though we do not observe any contagion effect. For instance, 
the innovation of Canada has a significant transmission effect on the volatilities of Japan, 
but no contagion effect has been identified between these countries. 
Panel A of Table 6 reports the test results of additional contagion effects 
associated with the subprime credit crisis. The estimation results are very similar to Panel 
A of Table 5. It suggests that the contagion effects do exist during the pre-crisis period. 
Panel B of Table 6 studies whether the subprime crisis causes an additional contagion 
effect. We expect to find positive and significant coefficients, d57j(US), which indicate 
that the subprime crisis is associated with an innovation transmission from the U.S. to the 
other countries. However, we do not find the evidence to support this conjecture. In 
addition, we observe that some contagion effects existing among G-7 countries are 
additionally caused by the subprime credit crisis. The significant cases are the U.K. and 
Germany with d8 6 3 (UK)=0.2163; Italy and Japan with d55j4 (JP)=0.1317 and 
dS45(IT)=0.6041. Moreover, the strength of the contagion effects from Canada to the 
U.S. and from France to the U.S. has been reinforced during the crisis. Especially for 
Canada, d517(CN) equals to 0.4603 at a 1% significance level. Panel C of Table 6 
studies the volatility spillover effects. Again, the results are similar to previous findings 
in Panel C of Table 5. 
5.3 Correlation Coefficient Test Results 
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Table 7 records the test results of vector autoregressive regression. We notice that 
the log indices are sensitive to some of the cross-market fundamental factors and lagged 
log indices. As for the U.S., the log index reacts positively to one lagged log index of 
Canada and Germany simultaneously. Furthermore, cross-market macro-fundamental 
factors, capital account, short-term interest rate of France and depreciation rate of Japan, 
cast statistically significant impacts on the log index of the U.S. This may explain the 
findings of panel B of Table 6 that the strength of the contagion effects from Canada and 
France to the U.S. has been reinforced during the subprime credit crisis. It may be due to 
these uncontrolled cross-market macro-fundamental effects that we identify the 
additional contagion effects between these two pairs of countries. In addition, we also 
notice that the influences of cross-market fundamental factors are exhibited among 
European countries. 
Table 8 reports the unadjusted correlation coefficient t-test results. It shows that 
the correlations between the U.S. and the other three countries, Canada; France; and the 
U.K., increase significantly due to the crisis. Except the correlation between Japan and 
Germany, all other correlation coefficients are higher in the turmoil period than those in 
the tranquil period, which is an indispensible prerequisite for the occurrence of contagion. 
Furthermore, there is no increase identified between the U.S. and Germany nor the U.S. 
and Italy. This is identical to the preliminary results obtained with simple cross-market 
correlation statistics based on the log indices. When Italy or Japan is treated as a leading 
country, there is no increase identified. 
However, when the adjustment takes place, the increases in correlation 
coefficients disappear, as shown in Table 9. Particularly, the correlations between the U.S. 
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and the other six countries do not increase during the subprime crisis. This indicates that 
the correlations among G-7 countries during the crisis period result largely from the 
increase in the volatilities of innovation. The adjustment correcting the heteroscedasticity 
bias reduces the strength of the correlation during the crisis. This result is, as we 
expected, identical to the results generated with the GARCH model. 
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6 Conclusion 
This paper studies the financial contagion of banking sectors among G-7 
countries by examining the excess comovement of stock indices of banking sectors 
during the first 18 months of the subprime credit crisis of 2007. Weekly indices of the 
banking sector obtained from DataStream are employed to facilitate the study. We first 
employ a two-stage threshold AR(l)-GARCH(l,l)-in-mean model in order to test 
whether there is any excess comovement among banking sectors during the subprime 
credit crisis. By adding eight fundamental factors and one global factor into our models, 
we control for the fundamental-related interdependence. Furthermore, we apply vector 
autoregressive regression, followed by the correlation coefficient tests, to study the 
changes in strength of the comovement of indices after controlling for cross-market 
fundamentals. 
In general, there are significant mutual contagion effects among G-7 countries 
during the full sample period according to the GARCH test. The mutual contagion effects 
tend to be regional. Specifically, there are contagion effects within European countries, 
but relatively weak effects between European countries and countries such as Canada and 
Japan. Similarly, there are contagion effects between Canada and the U.S. In addition, 
the U.S. market is highly related and affected by other countries, such as France, 
Germany and the U.K. 
The surprising finding is that the subprime credit crisis does not necessarily 
contribute to the contagion effects as expected. Specifically, we do not observe contagion 
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effects transmitted from the U.S. to other markets during the subprime crisis. Meanwhile, 
Canada and France exhibit additional impacts on the U.S. during the crisis. These 
marginal contagion effects brought by the crisis from either Canada or France to the U.S. 
may be due to the cross-market fundamental factors such as international trade and 
capital flows, which are not controlled in the GARCH model. 
In the VAR model, the unadjusted correlation coefficient test shows that the 
subprime credit crisis does result in significant increases in market comovements. The 
correlations are strengthened between the U.S. and three countries, Canada, France and 
the U.K., due to the crisis. However, this result is subject to the heteroscedasticity bias. 
With the appropriate adjustment, the strength of correlations during the crisis turns out to 
be the same as that during the non-crisis period. This result is consistent with the findings 
of the GARCH model. It suggests that the correlations of G-7 banking sectors during the 
crisis largely depend on the increase in volatility. In this respect, the excess comovements 
of banking sectors of G-7 countries during the subprime credit crisis are indeed not as 
strong as we expected. 
In light of the mutual contagion effects during either the crisis or the non-crisis 
period, we observe that, whether there is a crisis or not, the banking sectors of these 
developed countries are closely related, especially within their geographic region. Risk 
diversification driven investments among the banking sectors of countries within the 
same geographic region may not exhibit good performances. We cannot ignore that, as 
the center of the world economy, the U.S. has more or less influence over the other 
nations. From this perspective, the banking system of the U.S. may need to place more 
emphasis on the nations which possess the least contagion effects, for instance Italy or 
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Japan. Though we do not observe that the subprime credit crisis strengthens contagion 
effects from the banking sector of the U.S. to the other countries, we cannot safely draw 
the conclusion that the subprime credit crisis does no harm to the banking sectors either. 
In a highly globalized financial world, no economy can be fully exempt from a world-
wide financial crisis. Therefore, international cooperation on financial surveillance is 
necessary to maintain global stability. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Stock Indices of Banking Sectors in G-7 Countries 





































































































































































































































This table reports summary statistics of log-transformed indices of banking sectors in G-7 
countries. The sample contains weekly data from January 7, 2002 to January 5, 2009. 
The test statistic of Jarque-Bera is calculated as JB = -(s2 + Cf("3:> \ where n is the number 
of observations. S is the sample skewness. K is the sample kurtosis. JB is applied to test a 
joint null hypothesis that the sample data are from a normal distribution with both the 
skewness and the excess kurtosis equal to zero. '*', '**' and '***' indicate significance 
levels of 10%, 5% and 1 %, respectively. 
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Table 2 Correlations of Stock Indices of Banking Sectors in G-7 Countries 
CN FR 





















































































































































































This table reports pairwise correlations of log-transformed indices of banking sectors in 
G-7 countries. The sample contains weekly data from January 7, 2002 to January 5, 
2009. The test hypothesis is //0:ftj = 0; H^ptj * 0. '*', '**' and '***' indicate 
significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 3 Dickey Fuller Tests of Stock Indices of Banking Sectors in G-7 Countries 
No. Obs 





























The Dickey-Fuller test has been applied to test whether a unit root is present in an 
autoregressive model. The DF test takes the form: Art = (p-1). rt_! + nt, where: 
jUt~N(0,<T^). rt is a log-transformed DataStream banking sector stock index. A is the 
first difference operator, t is a time index, p is a coefficient. ut is an error term. The time 
series rt converges to a stationary time series if | p | < 1. If | p | = 1, the time series is not 
stationary and a unit root is present. If | p | >1, the time series is not stationary and the 
variance of the time series grows exponentially as t increases (Dickey and Fuller 1979). 
The test hypothesis is H0: \ p\ > 1; / / j : | p | < 1. Z-statistics are in parentheses. '*', 
'**' and '***' indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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This table reports the estimation results of model; rix - a, + $cru_x + yjnit + £j= 1 KinIint + 
*i,t ; hit =<*>] +aielt_1+bihit_1+fiTiefl_1 where eiit\nt^~N(0,hix) . riJt is the log-
transformed banking sector index of market i at time t. Jint denotes macro-fundamental 
variables for market i at time t. n denotes the number of fundamental factors. eit is the 
innovation, which is assumed to be serially uncorrected, mutually independent and 
following the GARCH process. T, a threshold dummy variable. Tt = 1 when the 
innovation at time t-\ is negative and 0 otherwise. hit is the conditional variance. /3 t_1 
is the information matrix at time t-\. Z-statistics are in parentheses. '*', '**' and '***' 
indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5 GARCH Tests of Contagion across Countries 






































































































Panel B: Transmissions of volatility of innovations 
Innovative market 
^ j ( C N ) 
X2J(FR) 
X3J(GE) 






























































































































































































































































































































This table reports the estimation results of model: rjX - a, +pjrjt_t + Yjhj,t +Y^=xKj1tljnt + 
I'=i 8i,jkt + Vj/, hj.t = "j + Ojvh-x + bfyx-i + ZU Ay4?t + / /^ 2 t - i where Vjjn^-NiO.ly,). 
Tjit is the log-transformed banking sector index of market 7 at time t. IjiUit denotes macro-
fundamental variables for market j at time t. n denotes the number of fundamental 
factors. eit is the estimated residual of innovative country i in the first stage model. 8t; 
is the transmission coefficient of indexj in response to the unexpected innovation from 
market /". A,j is the volatility transmission coefficient, which captures the dynamics of 
volatility in response to the unexpected innovations from the other market. 7} denotes a 
threshold dummy variable. 7} = 1 when the innovation at time t-\ is negative and 0 
otherwise. hjt is the conditional variance. /3 t_! is the information matrix at time t-\. 
The test hypothesis is H0: 5 i ; < 0; H^. 51 ; > 0. Z-statistics are in parentheses. '*', '**' 
and '***' indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 6 GARCH Tests of Marginal Contagion during the Subprime Credit Crisis 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This table reports the estimation results of model rjt - a, +pjrjt_1 +Yjhjt +K=i/c; „/;7rt + 
SU(5W +dSiJDt)iiiC+vj:i "i,t 0), >j + Oj v;.2£_! + bj ^ •ft_1 + l'i=1 x.j ift + f. Tj vfx_, where 
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vjit \flt-\ ~N(Q, hjit). Tjit is the log-transformed banking sector index of market j at time 
t. IjKt denotes macro-fundamental variables for market j at time t. n denotes the 
number of fundamental factors. eix is the estimated residual of innovative country /' in the 
first stage model. 8ij is the transmission coefficient of index j in response to the 
unexpected innovation from market /. Xtj is the volatility transmission coefficient, which 
captures the dynamics of volatility in response to the unexpected innovations from the 
other market. dStj denotes the additional contagion effect from the subprime credit 
crisis. Dt = 1 if the time period is from July 27, 2007 to January 5, 2009; otherwise, 
Dt = 0. Tj denotes a threshold dummy variable. 7} = 1 when the innovation at time t-\ 
is negative and 0 otherwise. hjt is the conditional variance. /3 t_! is the information 
matrix at time t-\. The test hypothesis is H0: dS^ < 0; H^: dS^j > 0. Z-statistics are in 
parentheses. '*', '**' and '***' indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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This table reports the estimation results of model: Rt - C + Zr=i$i7?u +I%=i<b„l„it +r]t', 




I ' t i't >'t i't >'t >'t ,r!>s} Q — (yCN ~FR rCE y.IT rJP y.UK yUSV KL,t — t / i , r <rL,t >rlX •rl,t'Tl,t ,rL,t >'L,t j 
/jr,£ = {i™,i™,e,^£ , i^,^,^}'withE( J ? £) = 0; E(ifc.ifc)=Z; E(r,t,r,'s) = 0 if t * S. rt is a 
vector of DataStream banking sector log index. Rt is a transposed vector of log indices in 
G-7 countries. Riit is a transposed vector of lagged log indices. <pi is a vector of the 
coefficients of lagged log indices, n denotes the number of fundamental factors. ln>t is a 
transposed vector of exogenous fundamental variables for G-7 countries. <$>n is a vector 
of the coefficients of fundamental variables. 7}t is a vector of error terms, m denotes the 
autoregressive order. We estimate m with the autoregressive order of two according to 
the Hannan-Quinn information criterion. Z-statistics are in parentheses. '*', '**' and 
'***' indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
61 
Table 8 T-Tests of Unadjusted Correlation Coefficients 





































































































































































































































































This table reports unadjusted cross-market correlation coefficients for G-7 countries. The 
tranquil period is defined as January 7, 2002 to July 26, 2007. The turmoil period is 
defined as July 27, 2007 to January 5, 2009. The full period is the combination of the two 
sub-sample periods. The correlation coefficients are estimated using estimated residuals 
from the VAR model reported in Table 7. The coefficients are transformed with a Fisher 
transformation. In transformation, the correlation coefficients are approximately normally 
distributed with mean y.t =\ln 7T"n> an(* variance of = —^, where t = horl indicating 
the turmoil or tranquil period, p^-denotes the correlation between country / and country j 
during the turmoil or tranquil period. nt indicates the observations during the turmoil or 
tranquil period. The two-sample t-statistics are calculated with t - t!h~'ii . The critical 
value for the t-test at a 5% significance level is 1.65. Any test statistic greater than this 
critical value is recorded as a significant increase, denoted "Y"; otherwise, no increase, 
denoted "N". The test hypothesis is H0; plUj > Ay; Hi: p\j < p^. 
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Table 9 T-Tests of Heteroscedasticity- Adjusted Correlation Coefficients 





































































































































































































































































This table reports heteroscedasticity-adjusted cross-market correlation coefficients for G-
7 countries. The tranquil period is defined as January 7, 2002 to July 26, 2007. The 
turmoil period is defined as July 27, 2007 to January 5, 2009. The full period is the 
combination of the two sub-sample periods. The correlation coefficients are calculated 
using estimated residuals from the VAR model reported in Table 7. The correlations for 
the turmoil period are adjusted with the formula: Pfr = 
^M'w)2 
5 = 2a . - l , whereoi. 
and axx are the variances of the crisis country x in the turmoil and tranquil periods, 
respectively, py is the correlation between country /' and j during the turmoil period. The 
adjusted correlation coefficients are then transformed with a Fisher transformation. In the 
transformation, the correlation coefficients are approximately normally distributed with 
mean|t£ — -In and variance o} - —^—, where t = h * orl indicating the turmoil or 
nt— 3 
tranquil period, pfj denotes the correlation between country i and country j during the 
turmoil or tranquil period. nt indicates the observations during the turmoil or tranquil 
period.The two-sample t-statistics are calculated with t = ^''^ . The critical value for the 
t-test at a 5% significance level is 1.65. Any test statistic greater than this critical value is 
recorded as a significant increase, denoted "Y"; otherwise, no increase, denoted "N". The 
test hypothesis is H0: pltj > pfy; Ht: pltJ < tfj. 
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